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This paper evaluates the impact of some key labor market reforms on rural-urban inequality and income 
distribution, using a household-disaggregated, recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model of China. We also explore how these factor market reforms interact with product market reforms 
currently underway as part of China’s WTO accession process. The simulation results show that the 
reforms in rural land rental market and Hukou system, as well as increasing off-farm labor mobility would 
reduce the urban-rural income ratio dramatically. Furthermore, the combination of WTO accession and 
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 Over the last fifty years, there have been three peaks in regional inequality within China: the Great 
Famine of the 1950’s, the Cultural Revolution of the late 60’s and early 70’s, and, most recently the period 
of openness and global integration of the 1990’s (Kanbur and Zhang, 2001). The ratio or urban to rural 
incomes is now approaching three, which is extremely high by international standards (World Bank, 1997). 
Despite this large income differential between rural and urban households, permanent migration in China 
has been limited. This is due to a combination of both direct and indirect measures. The most important 
factor is the system of official registration, whereby households must have a hukou in order to legally 
reside in an urban area. Without this registration, access to urban amenities such as housing and education, 
is limited and quite expensive. While highly skilled individuals and investors can purchase a “blue stamp 
hukou” (Chan and Zhang, 1999), this avenue is not available to the vast majority of rural residents. In light 
of these barriers to moving the entire household to an urban area, rural-urban migration is largely a 
transitory phenomenon – and one that is occurring on a massive scale. Recent estimates put the number of 
“floating workers” (excluding commuters) at about 90 million or roughly 19% in 2001 (Fan and Qie, 2002).  
 Concern about this increasing rural-income disparity has been heightened in light of China’s current 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Most analyses suggest that accession will exacerbate 
inequalities, by lowering barriers to grain imports and increasing opportunities for manufacturing exports as 
well as foreign investment in the urban-based services. (Ianchovichina and Martin, 2002). However, the 
degree to which this occurs will depend on the ease of movement of rural workers into the rapidly 
expanding urban and coastal economies. Higher rates of labor mobility will ensure that the benefits of 
WTO accession will be shared more widely. But this depends on how well the labor markets function.  
 In contrast to the more than two decades of product market reform in China, culminating in WTO 
accession, factor markets have received less attention until recently. In this paper we focus specifically on 
the labor markets where many barriers prevent a smoothly functioning market. Specifically, we introduce 
a novel approach to the modeling of rural-urban labor market linkages in China. We support this empirical 
model by drawing on recent econometric estimates of the relevant transfer elasticities, as well as survey-
based estimates of the current extent of the labor market distortion. These estimates are incorporated into 
a CGE model with highly disaggregated households in both the rural and urban areas, based on newly 
available data from the National Statistical Bureau of China.  With this framework in hand, we are able to 
shed light on the question of how the further opening up of the Chinese economy is likely to affect rural-
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urban inequality. We also explore the distributional consequences of lessening some of the existing factor 
market distortions. 
 This paper is organized as follows: the next section motivates the paper by discussing recent estimates 
of the size of the rural-urban wage gap induced by the hukou system, as well as limitations in the land 
market that inhibit off-farm labor mobility. We also examine evidence on the current degree of labor 
mobility between the agriculture and non-farm sectors. We then turn to the specification of a CGE model 
that explicitly incorporates these labor market distortions. The baseline scenario to 2007 is developed next. 
This is the backdrop against which China’s labor market distortions and her accession to the WTO will be 
evaluated. Section 5 assesses the impact of reducing labor market barriers, as well as China’s WTO 
accession, on rural-urban inequality. The final section offers conclusions and suggestions for future 
research. 
2. Modeling the Labor Market Distortions in China 
2.A Empirical Evidence on Rural-Urban Wage Differences  
As noted in the introduction, the presence of the hukou system has given rise to a huge floating labor 
force in China. If workers cannot move permanently to the city with their family, then they must migrate 
temporarily if they wish to take advantage of the very significant wage differential that exists at present. 
For example, Yaohui Zhao (1999a) documents an average annual wage gap between rural and urban 
work of 2,387.6 Yuan for unskilled rural workers of comparable background and ability in Sichuan 
Province in 1995. She also finds that there is considerable evidence that these temporary migrants would 
prefer to stay at home – in the rural areas -- and engage in non-farm work, if that were available (Zhao, 
1999b). In her econometric analysis, she finds that only about 30% the total rural-urban wage gap can be 
explained by the direct costs associated with migration (transportation, housing and the cost of obtaining 
the necessary certificates). The majority of the wage gap is due to social costs associated with migration – 
including: the disutility of being away from family, poor quality of housing, limited social services for 
migrants, the danger of being robbed enroute to and from the work location, and the general uncertainty 
associated with being a non-registered worker in an urban area. While these transactions costs are 
unobservable, they clearly represent a very significant burden on the migrants and their families.  
If there were no barriers to the movement of labor between rural and urban areas, we would expect 
real wages to be equalized for an individual worker with given characteristics. Shi, Sicular and Zhao 
(2002) explore the question of rural-urban inequality in greater detail for nine different provinces using the 
China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). They begin by breaking the income differential into earnings 
and non-earnings components. Earnings are then broken into labor and non-labor earnings. The former 
includes both wage earnings and earnings from self-employment, so the authors estimate a production 
function from which they are able to derive a shadow wage for labor. This permits them to come up with 
a comprehensive labor earnings differential between the rural and urban populations. They then control for 
differences in hours worked, which they find to be an important component of the total urban-rural income 
gap.  
Having isolated the difference in hourly earnings between rural and urban households, Shi, Sicular and 
Zhao (2002) control for differences in personal characteristics, as well as occupation. Once these 
differences are controlled for, the unexplained portion of this income gap falls to about 50%. They reason 
that the remaining 50% of this earnings differential must be either compensation for higher urban living 
costs, or the consequence of a labor market distortion. Once they have taken into account differences in 
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living costs, the authors conclude that the apparent labor market distortion is about 42% of the rural-urban 
labor income differential and 48% of the hourly earnings differential. When applied to the average wage 
differential (2.15 yuan/hour  = 3.43 yuan/hour urban – 1.28 yuan/hour rural), this amounts to an ad 
valorem rate of apparent taxation on rural wages of 81% = 100% * (.482 * 2.15) /1.28 . 
Clearly there may be other, unobserved factors inducing this rural-urban wage differential, in which 
case estimation of the labor market distortion via subtraction of known factors is biased in the direction of 
overstating the hukou-related distortion. In fact, rural-urban wage differentials persist in market 
economies which do not have a household registration system. Therefore, it is useful to consider an 
alternative approach whereby one estimates the direct impact of household registration status on the 
observed wage difference among households. Shi (2002) takes this approach to the problem, using the 
same CHNS data set. He finds that only 28% of the rural-urban wage difference can be expla ined directly 
via the coefficient on the hukou registration variable. This is quite a bit less than the 48% left unexplained 
via the subtraction approach of Shi, Sicular and Zhao (2002). For purposes of our general equilibrium 
model, we insert the larger (81% ad valorem) transaction tax distortion into the initial equilibrium data 
base. However, when it comes to modeling labor market reform, we only remove the portion of this tax 
distortion that has been attributed to the hukou system directly in Shi’s econometric analysis.1  
2.B Modeling Transactions Costs:  
 We model these transactions costs associated with the unexplained wage differential explicitly as a 
burden that is assumed by temporary migrants. Of course these migrants are heterogeneous and the 
extent of the burden varies widely. Those individuals who are single, and live close to the urban area in 
which they work, are likely to experience minor inconvenience as a result of this temporary migration. We 
expect them to be the first to migrate (ceteris paribus) in response to higher urban wages. On the other 
hand, some migrants have large families and come from a great distance. Their urban living conditions are 
often very poor and it is not uncommon for them to be robbed on the train when they are returning home 
for holidays. For such individuals, the decision to migrate temporarily is likely to be a marginal one – and 
one which they may not choose to repeat. With this heterogeneous population in mind, we postulate a 










= ⋅  
 
  (1) 
where TIndCost  is the ad valorem tax equivalent of the indirect transactions costs, MigL is the migrant 
rural workers and rL is the laobor force in rural area. δ  and α are elasticity and shift parameters 
respectively. 
                                                                 
1 It is a difficult to compare these distortions across different studies, even though they use the same data base, so we key on the 
rural-urban wage differential. The portion of this differential that is not explained by occupation, education and other personal 
characteristics is 58% in both the Shi (2002) and the Shi, Sicular and Zhao (2002) studies. Shi, Sicular and Zhao (2002) then 
deduct the cost of living component to reach their 48% estimate of the portion of the wage differential due to labor market 
distortions.  In his regression analysis, Shi (2002) finds that 28% of the overall wage differential can be attributed directly to 
possession of an urban hukou. He does not control for living costs, but if we use the 48% figure from the other study, then we 
conclude that the hukou accounts for .28/.48 = .58 of the apparent labor market distortion.  
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The transactions cost function in (1) has a simple, constant elasticity functional form, which begins at 
the origin and reaches the observed cost-of-living adjusted indirect tax rate of 81% of rural wages at the 
current level of temporary migration (about 70 million workers in our baseline scenario). We assume that 
further increases in temporary migration have only a modest impact on these transactions costs.2 In 
addition to these indirect costs, the temporary migrant also incurs direct costs associated with the higher 
urban cost of living. Based on Shi, Sicular and Zhao (2002), these are estimated to be 10% of the urban-
rural wage gap and about 17% of the rural wage rate. 
In our subsequent analysis, the direct and indirect transactions costs associated with the temporary 
migration of unskilled and semi-skilled labor will play an important role.3 Any labor market reforms that 
reduce the transactions costs imposed on rural labor will increase the flow of workers to the city, thereby 
depressing urban wages and increasing rural wages. This will have the effect of reducing inequality. 
These transactions costs will also play an important role in the case of trade liberalization. Here, increases 
in the demand for unskilled labor in the urban areas will cause urban wages to rise, thereby drawing in 
more rural labor. However, this supply of rural labor will come at some cost – both in terms of higher 
transport and living costs for the worker, as well as the indirect transactions costs – since the additional 
workers are presumably being drawn from a greater distance or from less favorable family/social 
circumstances.  
2.C Off-farm Labor Mobility  
In developed economies off-farm labor mobility is typically viewed as being a function of the relative 
wages in the farm and non-farm sectors. However, in China, the off-farm labor supply decision is 
complicated by institutional factors which have been built into the system in order to keep the agricultural 
population in place (Zhao, 1999b). During earlier years, the Chinese government sought to make it costly 
for individuals to leave the rural areas by tying incomes to daily participation in collective work. More 
recently, the absence of well-defined land tenure has raised the opportunity cost of leaving the farm 
(Yang, 1997). Households that cease to farm the land may lose the rights to it, so they have a strong 
incentive to continue some level of agricultural activity, even when profitability is quite low (Zhao, 1999a).  
With only modest growth in rural, non-farm activities, this seriously limits the ability of households to obtain 
off-farm work (Zhao, 1999b).4 Our approach to modeling the off-farm labor supply decision is to treat this 
as a function of the average return to agricultural activity, inclusive of the return to land. This has the 
effect of retaining extra workers in agriculture under our baseline analysis. One of the scenarios that we 
will consider below is the introduction of a well-functioning land rental market through which rural 
households seeking work in the city can rent their land to other households, thereby separating their labor 
migration decision from the return to agricultural land. This has important implications for both our baseline 
scenario, as well as the WTO accession scenario. 
3. CGE Model 
The CGE model of China used in this study has been developed at the Development Research Center 
of the State Council in Beijing with the explicit objective of modeling inequality and the rural-urban labor 
                                                                 
2 We assume that a doubling of temporary migration would only increase the marginal cost of migration by 10%. 
3 Skilled workers make up a very small portion of the rural labor force and typically are able to obtain hukou if they choose to 
move to the urban areas. 
4 However, as noted by Parish, Zhe and Li (1995), the rural labor market is looking more like a market all the time. 
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market. It is based on an earlier set of models used to analyze the economy-wide implications of China’s 
WTO accession (Development Research Center, 1998) and the income distribution consequences of trade 
and tax reform (Wang and Zhai, 1998).  The model has its intellectual roots in the group of single -country, 
applied general equilibrium models used over the past two decades to analyze the impact of trade policy 
reform (Dervis, de Melo and Robinson, 1982; Shoven and Whalley, 1992; de Melo and Tarr, 1992).5  A 
comprehensive algebraic description of the model is provided in the appendix. Here, we focus on the main 
features of the model -- especially those that are relevant for assessing the rural-urban distributional 
consequences of labor market distortions and trade liberalization.  
3.A Modeling Household Behavior 
 In order to come to grips with the inequality question, it is critical that that we disaggregate households to 
the maximum extent possible, subject to the limitations posed by survey sampling, computational 
constraints, and human capacity for analysis. It is particularly important to disaggregate households along 
those dimensions that are most important for analysis of labor market impacts. Thus, for example, one 
would not want to group together rural and urban households since they differ in their hukou status. Also, 
due to the segmentation in the rural labor market between agriculture and non-agriculture, we would like to 
keep these households separated as well – at least to the maximum extent possible. Therefore we 
disaggregate households receiving 95% or more of their income from agriculture. In the urban sample, we 
separate out those households that are specialized in wage and salaried labor, as they will likely be most 
affected by labor market reforms. We also disaggregate households that rely on transfer payments for 
95% of their income. The remaining households are considered “diversified”. This gives us the grouping of 
100 representative households in Table 1 = 20 vingtiles (income levels) for 2 rural and 3 urban strata, 
yielding a total of 40 rural and 60 urban household groups.  
Households consume goods and services according to a preference structure determined by the 
Extended Linear Expenditure System (ELES). Through specification of a subsistence quantity of each 
good or service, this expenditure function generates non-homothetic demands – whereby the larger the 
relative importance of subsistence consumption (e.g., it would be high for rice, and low for automobiles) 
the more income-inelastic the household’s demand for that good.  
Each household is endowed with three types of labor: skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled. These are 
distinguished by educational attainment of the worker6 with semi-skilled workers having a middle- or high 
school education, and skilled workers having an educational attainment beyond high school7. Households 
are also endowed with profits from family-owned agriculture and non-agriculture enterprises, property 
income and transfers. Agricultural profits represent returns to family labor, land and capital. However, as 
                                                                 
5  The China model began as a prototype CGE model developed for the Trade and Environment Program of the OECD 
Development Center (Beghin, et al., 1994).  However, since that time, significant modifications have been made to capture the 
major features of the trade and tax system in the Chinese economy  (Wang and Zhai, 1998, Zhai and Li, 2000), the addition of a 
full-fledged demographic module (Zhai and Wang, 2001), as well as introducing disaggregated households and an improved 
treatment of labor markets (this study).   
6 We would prefer to base this split on occupation – what they actually do – versus their potential as determined by education. 
However, the rural household survey does not support this type of labor split.  
7 Since the rural survey only reports the highest educational attainment of the household we not have endowment by worker. This 
biases the skill level of rural households upwards. However, since the vast majority of rural households are unskilled, this is less 
of a problem in practice. 
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noted above, the off-farm labor supply decision is a function of the combined return to labor and land in 
agriculture, owing to the absence of an effectively functioning land market in many rural areas. 
Specification of the value of the off-farm labor supply elasticity draws on the econometric work of 
Sicular and Zhao (2002). Those authors report results from a household labor supply model estimated 
using labor survey data from the 1997 CHNS data set for nine central provinces. This survey measures 
the labor supply of individuals within each household to farm and non-farm activities. Sicular and Zhao 
estimate the implicit wage for each individual in the sample if they were to work in agriculture or non-
agricultural self-employment, and they also estimate the non-agriculture wage that this person could obtain. 
They then estimate labor supply equations for self-employed agricultural labor, self-employed non-
agricultural labor, and wage labor. From these equations, it is possible to calculate elasticities of labor 
transfer from farm to non-farm activities. They report a variety of elasticities in their paper.8 We adopt 
their estimate of 2.67 for use in this work. Thus, a 1% decrease in the return to farming, relative to the 
market wage, results in a 2.67% increase in off-farm labor supply.  
3.B Modeling Production, Exports and Imports 
When it comes to modeling trade liberalization, an important characteristic of our CGE model is the explicit 
treatment of two separate foreign trading regimes.  One is the export processing regime, which receives 
duty-free imports and is therefore extremely open, with considerable foreign-investment.  The other sector 
is the ordinary trade regime.  Since the 1990s, processing exports have grown rapidly as a result of their 
preferential treatment. They now account for more than half of China’s total exports.  Obviously, any 
analysis of external trade and the impact of changes in trade policy must have an explicit treatment of this 
dualistic foreign trading regime in the model. 
Trade is modeled using the Armington assumption for import demand, and a constant elasticity of 
transformation for export supply. Thus, Chinese products are assumed to be differentiated from foreign 
products, and exports from China are treated as different products from those sold on the domestic 
market. The small country assumption is assumed for imports and so world import prices are exogenous in 
terms of foreign currency. Exports are demanded according to constant-elasticity demand curves, the 
price-elasticities of which are high but less than infinite. Therefore the terms of trade for China are 
endogenous in our simulation. 
Production in each of the sectors of the economy is modeled using nested constant elasticity of 
substitution functions, and constant returns to scale is assumed. Sectors differentiate between rural and 
urban labor that substitute imperfectly between them. This is an indirect means of building into the model a 
geographic flavor – since some sectors will be located largely in urban areas, while others will be 
predominantly in rural areas.  By limiting the substitutability of rural and urban labor in each sector, we are 
able to proxy the economic effect of geographically distributed production activity. Thus, if trade 
liberalization boosts the demand for goods that are predominantly produced in urban areas, then urban 
                                                                 
8 Due to the variety of labor supply elasticities in response to the three different wages in their model, the authors obtain a variety 
of labor transfer elasticities, depending on the “thought experiment” being conducted. These are asymmetric, with the response 
to a change in shadow wages differing from the response of labor supply to a change in the market wage. However, this response 
is treated as symmetric in our model. This makes it difficult to choose the correct parameter for our analysis. We focus on the 
transfer of labor from agriculture to market wage employment in response to a change in returns to agriculture, since this transfer 
accounts for the bulk of the labor flow in our analysis.  
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wages will rise, relative to rural wages, and migration will be encouraged. Of course we would ideally 
model the geographic distribution of industrial activity, but unfortunately the data do not exist to support this 
type of split.  
All commodity and non-labor factor markets are assumed to clear at market prices. With the 
exception of the farm/non-farm labor supply decision, labor is assumed to be mobile across sectors, but 
rural-urban migration is subjected to the direct and indirect transactions costs discussed above, so the 
unskilled and semi-skilled rural wages are equated to the comparable urban wages, less transactions costs. 
Capital is assumed to be partially mobile, reflecting differences in the marketability of capital goods across 
sector.  
In order to look at the impacts of labor mobility over time, the model has a simple recursive dynamic 
structure.  Dynamics in the model originate from accumulation of productive factors and productivity 
changes.  The model is benchmarked on China’s 1997 Social Accounting Matrix and is solved for 
subsequent years from 1998 to 2007. We turn now to the details of the baseline scenario. 
4 Base Case Projections and Simulation Design 
4.A Base Case Scenario 
Our base case scenario is purposely defined as being without China’s WTO accession. This is because 
we seek to explore separately the impact of labor market distortions and WTO accession, thereafter 
examining how this recent opening of the economy interacts with existing labor market distortions. In the 
base case, GDP grows at an average rate of about 7.8%, and life expectancy rises from 70.3 to 74.0 
years of age. Urban and rural fertility rates also rise. Both of these factors give rise to a larger population 
in 2007 (1.34 billion), with a commensurate increase in the labor force which grows at about 1.2%/year. In 
contrast, the capital stock grows at a 10% annual rate, leading to substantial capital deepening.  Total 
factor productivity represents the difference between the GDP projections and the growth rate supported 
by the accumulation of labor and capital. This ranges from 1.74% to 2.87% over the projections period. 
The baseline scenario also shows a substantial increase in openness of the economy, relative to 1997, with 
exports’ share in GDP rising by four percentage points and imports share in GDP rising by about seven 
percentage points. The current account surplus declines over the baseline period – to about 40% of its 
1997 level. 
The baseline scenario also shows a narrowing of the urban/rural income ratio, falling from 3.03 to 
2.58 as the urban labor force grows by about 56 million people – or nearly one-third, whereas the rural 
labor grows by only 25 million, from a base of 460 million in 1997. As a result, the rural share in the overall 
labor force falls from 71.7% to 67.2%. Of this total rural labor force, the share of agricultural employment 
also falls – as a result of off-farm migration.  
In the absence of WTO accession, it is necessary to make some hypothetical assumptions in 
constructing the base case scenario. Quota growth rates for those imports subject to quantitative 
restrictions (grains, cotton, wool, sugar, petroleum and autos) are assumed to be 3%/year. Export quotas 
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on textiles and apparel are assumed to growth at annual rates of 5.7% and 6.0%, respectively.9 All tax 
rates are held constant over the baseline.  
Experimental Design: Against this back drop we consider a sequence of alternative scenarios in 
order to explore the relationship between ongoing economic growth, labor market distortions, further 
opening of the economy to world trade, and rural-urban inequality. With one exception, these scenarios are 
treated in a cumulative fashion, so that the second scenario includes the first as well as the second 
modification, the third includes one, two and three, and so on. As a consequence, we will need to 
distinguish between incremental and cumulative effects. The first three modifications which we consider 
relate to the functioning of the labor market, while the fourth incremental scenario pertains to the impact of 
further opening China’s economy to trade. In order to assess the interactions between labor market and 
product market reforms, we also conduct a fifth (non-cumulative) experiment in which WTO accession is 
implemented in the absence of labor market reforms. 
In the first scenario, we examine the impact of a relaxation of the hukou system such that the ad 
valorem tax equivalent of the indirect transactions costs are reduced from 81% to 34% -- at current levels 
of migration. As noted previously, this is the portion of the observed differential in wages that has been 
directly attributed to possession of a hukou (Shi).10  We label this scenario: TRANS and focus on the 
difference between rural-urban inequality, and a variety of other variables of interest, in 2007 with and 
without the reduced transactions costs. 
In the second scenario (LAND), we consider the impact of relaxing one of the important barriers to 
off-farm labor mobility – the absence of well-defined property rights for agricultural land.  As noted above, 
this leads to the retention of additional labor in the farm sector in the baseline scenario. Specifically, we 
consider the implications of introducing land reform in 2003, such that farm households evaluate the 
difference between the marginal value product of their labor in agriculture and non-farm rural wages in 
deciding where to work. This contrasts with the baseline scenario in which farm households include the 
returns to land in their decision to work on- or off-farm, since leaving the farm means losing the land. 
The third labor market scenario (MOBIL) appeals to the potential for increasing inter-sectoral 
mobility of the farm population. There is some preliminary evidence that increased education increases the 
off-farm supply elasticity of labor (unpublished results based on the work of Shi, Sicular and Zhao, 2002). 
In order to explore the importance of this parameter in determining rural-urban inequality in China, we 
implement a revised baseline in which we double the off-farm supply elasticity. This has the effect of 
increasing the outflow of labor from agriculture, thereby lifting on-farm wages. When combined with the 
first two labor market reforms, we expect this to have a substantial impact on rural-urban inequality. 
Finally, we add the further opening of China’s economy to world trade through WTO accession. 
Here, import tariffs are reduced gradually over the simulation period.11 Quota growth rates for rice, wheat, 
corn, cotton, wool, vegetable oil and sugar are accelerated. Textile and clothing quotas on exports to North 
America and European markets are phased out completely by 2007. Following Francois (2002), we model 
                                                                 
9 In order to facilitate our analysis of the interaction between labor market reforms and WTO accession, we endeavor to have a 
common accession experiment both with, and without labor market reforms. Therefore, the path of quota rents observed in the 
absence of labor market reforms is imposed on the various labor market reform scenarios. 
10 As noted previously, the full size of the differential is obtained by controlling for observed differences between rural and urban 
wages, but this may well be due to other factors.  
11 The sectoral reduction rates are aggregated from Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) tariff schedules 
for the period of 2002-2007 and weighted by 1997 ordinary trade data. 
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the impact of service sector liberalization as halving the barriers to services trade.  We also introduce a 
20% productivity boost for the automobile sector to reflect the efficiency gain from industrial restructuring 
and realization of economic scale in this sector after China WTO accession (Francois, 2002). As noted 
above, we implement this accession scenario in two different ways: first, in conjunction with labor market 
reforms (WTO-L) and secondly, in their absence (WTO). By comparing these two outcomes we are able 
to assess the potential interaction between labor and product market reforms in China. 
5 Simulation Results 
5.A Labor Market Reforms 
5.A.1 Aggregate results 
The aggregate results from these simulations are reported in Table 4. We begin by focusing on the labor 
market reforms. Here, we are interested in the extent to which these reforms have comparable qualitative 
effects on key macro-economic variables. To the extent that these effects are the same, then we explore 
the relative size of each of their incremental impacts, as a means of assessing the relative importance of 
each of these labor market distortions.  
 At the top of Table 4, we see labor migration, reported in both percentage change terms and in 
millions of individuals. It is evident that all three labor market reforms serve to increase migration from the 
relatively low productivity, agricultural sector, to the higher productivity, urban sector. In the case of land 
reform, 13.8 million additional workers leave agriculture when they are permitted to rent their land out, as 
opposed to simply leaving it behind (LAND scenario in Table 4). These individuals migrate to the off-farm 
rural labor market, which in turn precipitates an additional 10.95 million temporary migrants to the urban 
sector in order to equalize rural and urban wages, net of transactions costs. The high ratio of rural-urban to 
off-farm migration indicates that the rural non-farm economy has a limited capacity to absorb these 
additional workers. The release of these workers from agriculture tends to depress wages in the rural, 
non-farm economy, where wages fall by 10.59% in the case of land reform. (All price changes are 
relative to the numeraire, which is foreign exchange.) This wage drop plays a role in dampening out-
migration from agriculture.  
Urban unskilled wages are linked to rural wages via the equilibrium condition that rural wages plus 
transactions costs must equal the urban wages. Recall that our specification of transactions costs is 
increasing in total migration – under the hypothesis that the new migrants had not previously looked for 
work in the city due to an excess of costs over expected benefits. Therefore, their migration results in 
higher indirect transactions costs at the margin. However, with rural wages falling, the transactions costs 
rise, relative to rural wages, as reported in Table 4. So the decline in urban wages is smaller than that for 
rural wages. 
Off-farm, semi-skilled wages fall by a lesser amount than their unskilled counterparts. While the 
agricultural labor force accounts for two-thirds of the total unskilled labor force in China, it accounts for 
less than half of the semi-skilled labor force. So the additional release of workers from farming has less of 
an impact on wages for this category of worker. As a result, semi-skilled labor shows the largest absolute 
as well as percentage increases in migration. Skilled wages actually rise, as there is almost no skilled labor 
employed in the agricultural sector, and the ensuing increase in non-agricultural activity, relative to the 
baseline, boosts the demand for skilled worker, who are also not subject to binding Hukou restrictions. 
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 The qualitative impact of a doubling of the off-farm supply elasticity for labor (MOBIL scenario in 
Table 4) is quite similar to that for the land reform scenario. Here, the increased off-farm migration by 
2007 is equal to 12.43 million, precipitating an increase of 10 million in temporary rural-urban migration. 
Once again, the largest percentage decline in wages is for the unskilled workers, followed by semi-skilled 
and finally skilled labor. And, as with the land reform scenario, the strongest migration response occurs for 
the semi-skilled labor category. 
 While the LAND and MOBIL labor market scenarios focus on the barriers to off-farm mobility of 
labor, the TRANS scenario focuses on rural-urban migration. When the transactions costs associated with 
temporary migration are reduced, due to elimination of the hukou system, rural-urban migration expands 
by 27.45 million workers. Since the transactions costs associated with temporary rural-urban migration 
operate like a tax on rural labor, the first effect of their reduction is to increase the supply of rural labor to 
the urban economy, thereby boosting rural wages and depressing urban wages. This represents a direct 
redistribution of the rents associated with the hukou system from urban to rural households. In addition, by 
raising rural wages, this hukou reform scenario also draws some additional labor out of agriculture, 
although this aspect of migration  (3.78 million workers) is much more modest than under the other two 
scenarios. 
 Since the LAND and MOBIL scenarios both involve the exit of a substantial amount of labor from 
agriculture, the value marginal product of land falls, as do land rents. In both cases, land rents fall by more 
than 6%, whereas the decline in land rents for the transactions cost scenario is only 0.66%.  
 Aggregate GDP as well as economic welfare, measured by the sum of the Equivalent Variations for 
all households, rise in all three labor reform scenarios. This is due to the fact that each of these reforms 
results in the movement of labor from relatively low productivity sectors (agriculture, and rural non-farm 
employment), into higher productivity activities (rural non-farm work, and urban employment, 
respectively). This tends to boost all of the macro-economic aggregates, with the exception of 
consumption in the LAND and MOBIL scenarios. In these cases, the higher agricultural and food prices 
result in higher composite consumption price, relative to that of investment goods, thereby leading to a 
decline in real aggregate consumption.  
The question of income distribution is central to our paper – and there are several measures of 
inequality in China reported in Table 4. First, consider the urban-rural income ratio. This declines in all 
three scenarios, as income is redistributed from urban to rural households. The most dramatic declines are 
for the two scenarios that operate on the Hukou system and land market: TRANS and LAND. In the 
case of the transactions cost scenario, for example, this ratio declines from 2.58 to 2.41, which amounts to 
0.172 points (see Table 4). The decline for LAND is comparable (0.167 points), whereas the decline for 
MOBIL scenario is slightly lower (0.15 points). When combined, these measures result in a very 
substantial decline in rural-urban inequality in China, bringing the projected 2007 urban-rural income ratio 
down from 2.58 to 2.09.  
 Table 4 also reports the absolute change in several Gini coefficients. Since rural households benefit 
relative to urban households, and rural households are much poorer than their urban counterparts, it is 
hardly surprising that the national Gini coefficient for China also falls under the three labor reform 
scenarios. On the other hand, the Gini coefficients within the urban and rural populations show a slight 
increase in inequality. This is most pronounced in the urban areas, where the low-income, unskilled labor 
dependent urban households are hurt most by labor market reforms. In order to better understand what is 
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driving these changes in urban and rural inequality, we turn to Table 5, which reports the change in 
welfare for representative households across the income spectrum in each of the five strata. 
5.A.2 Disaggregate result  
The first set of results in Table 5 reports the impact of hukou reform (reduced transactions costs) on 
disaggregated household groups in urban and rural China. It is clear from this table that the largest benefits 
accrue to the diversified rural households. These are the households supplying temporary migrant labor to 
urban areas. They bear the direct burden of the associated transactions costs. When the Hukou system is 
reformed, they are the ones who benefit most directly. The agriculture specialized households also benefit 
from the rise in  rural wages – although their welfare gains are somewhat less, as these wages gains are 
incompletely transmitted from the non-farm to farm sectors. While the benefits from hukou reform are 
spread relatively evenly across income levels within each of the rural strata, the higher income households 
– both within the diversified and agricultural strata -- tend to experience larger proportionate gains, thereby 
contributing to the increase in the Gini coefficient within the rural sector.  
 Turning to the urban households in Table 5, we see welfare losses for all but the richest labor-
specialized households. They suffer from the influx of additional unskilled and semi-skilled rural migrants. 
The impacts on the transfer specialized households is quite small and  of mixed signs. Overall, the urban 
index of income inequality worsens somewhat. However, the increases in the within sector Gini indexes 
for the rural and urban sectors is overwhelmed by the reduction in rural-urban inequality, so that the 
national Gini index for China falls by 0.0142. This is a substantial movement in an index which tends to 
change very slowly. 
 The next set of results in Table 5 report the disaggregated household impacts of land reform. In 
contrast to the previous experiment, we now see the largest gains accruing to the agriculture-specialized, 
rural households. These are the households that are currently constrained to remain active on the farm if 
they wish to retain rights to their land. By permitting some of these households to rent the land and migrate 
to the city if they wish to do so, land market reform raises the shadow value of the labor remaining in 
agriculture very substantially across all income levels. The diversified rural households also gain, with 
some of the highest gains coming at the lowest income levels, where households are more heavily reliant 
on income from agriculture. Overall, the rural Gini index is hardly changed (Table 4).   
 Urban household welfare falls across the board in this experiment and it falls most for the poorest 
households. This is due to the large boost to rural-urban migration of unskilled and semi-skilled labor (recall 
Table 4) as well as the increase in food prices following the reduction in agricultural labor force. As a 
consequence the urban Gini index rises. However, from the point of view of overall inequality in China, the 
main consequence of this experiment is to redistribute income from urban to rural households and this 
lowers the Gini index by 0.012. 
 The final experiment reported in Table 4 is qualitatively quite similar to land reform. By increasing the 
elasticity of off-farm labor mobility, this scenario boosts on-farm wages and therefore agricultural 
incomes. The resulting increase in rural-urban migration once again depresses urban wages, relative to the 
baseline scenario. Consequently, while urban inequality rises, the national Gini index falls. In quantitative 
terms, these results are slightly smaller than those associated with land reform. 
 Cumulative effects of labor market reforms: The cumulative impact of all three labor market 
reform scenarios on the macro-economic performance of the Chinese economy in 2007 is also reported in 
Table 4. From these results, it is clear that such reforms could be potentially quite significant. Overall GDP 
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is 3.74 % higher and aggregate welfare, measured by the summation of household Equivalent Variations is 
3.22% greater in 2007. Most striking is the impact on unskilled wages and relative rural and urban 
incomes. Urban unskilled wages are 23.6% lower as a consequence of these labor market reforms, while 
the 2007 ratio of urban to rural incomes drops from 2.58 in the baseline to 2.09 in the labor market reform 
scenario. 
 Figures 1 and 2 show the cumulative effect of labor market reform on disaggregate urban and rural 
household welfare. Here, the potential redistribution of welfare is quite striking. The equivalent variation 
for agriculture-specialized rural households is between 17 and 27% of initial income. Other rural 
households also benefit significantly from these reforms. In contrast, urban household welfare falls by as 
much as 16% of initial income for the poorest urban households (apart from those reliant on transfer 
payments, who are somewhat insulated from these reforms). It is clear that the main impact of the 
restrictive labor market policies has been to boost urban household welfare at the expense of rural 
household welfare – particularly those employed in agriculture. 
5.B Impacts of WTO Accession and Interactions with Labor Market Reforms 
We now turn to issue of product market reform – more specifically China’s accession to the WTO which 
is currently underway. In order to assess the way in which labor market reforms might interact with WTO 
accession, we perform two experiments. The first of these involves WTO accession in the absence of 
labor market reforms (experiment WTO), while the second evaluates the impact in the presence of labor 
market reforms (WTO-L). The macro-economic results from this experiment are reported in Table 4 as 
well – in terms of deviations from the baseline simulation in the year 2007 when China’s WTO accession 
is complete.  
Let us begin with the changes in factor prices, we see that skilled wages rise more than semi-skilled 
wages, which in turn rise more than unskilled wages – the latter actually fall, relative to the numeraire 
price of foreign exchange. The relatively greater increase in skilled wages is fueled by the tendency for 
manufacturing and services sectors to expand at the expense of agriculture. The former sectors are 
relatively intensive in the use of skilled and semi-skilled labor, thereby boosting wages for these factors, 
relative to unskilled wages. The decline in agricultural profitability and the accompanying expansion of 
urban activity gives rise to additional out-migration from agriculture, along with increased temporary 
migration of 1.46 million workers (experiment WTO) so that the rural wage is once again equated to the 
urban wage, less the direct and indirect costs associated with migration. In the case of WTO-L, the 
migration response is greater (2.32 million workers), due to the lesser transactions costs and the higher 
degree of labor mobility out of agriculture.  
Now turn to the real GDP and welfare effects of WTO accession. In the absence of labor market 
reform, these both increase by 0.65% and 0.73% respectively, while consumption increases by more, and 
investment by less than this amount. The reduction in trade barriers gives a substantial boost to trade in 
China, with both exports and imports rising by 15%. Contrasting these macroeconomic outcomes with the 
incremental effect of WTO accession in the presence of labor market reforms (WTO-L), we see that the 
GDP and welfare gains are smaller (0.63 and 0.68 respectively) than under the WTO scenario. This, 
despite the fact that the functioning of the labor markets is improved and the ensuing impact on labor 
migration – both off-farm and rural-urban – is greater, under the WTO-L scenario. The smaller aggregate 
impacts under WTO-L are due to the fact that the labor market reforms reduce the productivity 
differentials between the farm, non-farm rural and urban sectors. As a result, when WTO accession 
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stimulates migration out of agriculture and from the rural to urban sectors, the ensuing gain in overall 
productivity is smaller under the WTO-L scenario.  
WTO accession in the presence of labor market reforms (WTO-L) also has a sharper negative 
impact on agricultural land rents (see Table 4), as farmers no longer stay active in agriculture simply to 
avoid losing their land. With 0.76 million more people leaving agriculture, and wage rates rising more under 
the WTO-L scenario, land rents fall by 6.8% as opposed to 3.5% under the WTO scenario in the absence 
of labor market reforms. 
Table 6 reports the disaggregated household impacts of the two WTO accession scenarios. These 
results show that the incremental effects of WTO accession in the presence of labor market reforms tend 
to benefit the urban households more, and the rural households somewhat less, than WTO accession in the 
absence of such reforms. However, such interaction effects are overwhelmed by the direct effect of labor 
market reforms on rural-urban inequality. This can be seen in the final column of Table 4, which reports 
the cumulative effect of WTO accession and labor market reforms together, relative to the baseline in 
2007. In spite of the modest boost to the urban/rural income ratio following WTO accession, this measure 
of inequality drops dramatically when combined with labor market reforms.  
6 Conclusions 
This paper has utilized a household-disaggregated, recursively dynamic CGE model of the Chinese 
economy to evaluate the impact of several key labor market distortions in China on  rural-urban inequality 
and income distribution. The labor market imperfections considered include: (a) the hukou system of rural 
and urban household registration that has supported significant differences in rural and urban wages and 
has contributed to the existence of nearly 100 million temporary migrant workers in China, (b) the absence 
of a fully functioning land market which would permit existing land owners to rent their land to others and 
migrate to the city if they found wages there to be more attractive, and (c) the relatively low elasticity of 
off-farm labor supply which inhibits the transmission of wage signals between the farm and non-farm 
economies. We also explore how these factor market reforms interact with product market reforms 
currently underway as part of China’s WTO accession process. 
 The reform associated with the land rental market has a significant impact on rural-urban 
inequality. Introduction of a fully functioning market for agricultural land permits agricultural households to 
focus solely on the differential between farm and non-farm returns to labor in determining whether to 
work on- or off-farm. This gives rise to an additional 14 million people moving out of agriculture by 2007 
and it lends a significant boost to the  incomes of those remaining in agriculture. This off-farm migration 
also contributes to a significant rise in rural-urban migration, thereby lowering urban wages – particularly 
for unskilled workers. As a consequence, rural-urban inequality declines significantly as does China’s 
national Gini coefficient. The experiment whereby we increase off-farm labor mobility has a very similar 
effect on China’s economy, boosting GDP by moving more labor out of agriculture and reducing rural-
urban inequality.  
 Of the three factor market distortions, we find the Hukou reform to be most significant, both in 
terms of its macro-economic impact, as well as its impact on income distribution. We model this as a 
reduction in the indirect transactions costs currently incurred by temporary migrants. Whereas the other 
two labor market reforms primarily benefit the agricultural households, this reform benefits most the rural 
households currently sending temporary migrants to the city. By reducing the implicit tax on temporary 
migrants, Hukou reform boosts their welfare and contributes to increased rural-urban migration. The 
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combined effect of all three factor market reforms is to reduce the urban-rural income ratio dramatically, 
from 2.58 in 2007 under our baseline scenario to 2.09. 
 Finally, we offer some insight into the potential interactions between labor market reforms and 
WTO accession. A significant portion of the aggregate gains under WTO accession come about by 
moving labor out of agriculture and into relatively higher productivity activities in the manufacturing and 
service sectors. By reducing this productivity differential across sectors, labor market reforms dilute the 
gains under WTO accession. When viewed as a combined policy package, however, the value of these 
reforms is much greater than those available only under WTO accession. Furthermore, rather than 
increasing inequality in China, the combined impact of WTO accession and labor market reforms reduces 
rural-urban income inequality quite significantly.  
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Table 1. Per Capita Income, by Location, Stratum and Vingtile (Yuan, 1997) 
Vingtile Rural Households Urban Households 
(poorest =1) Agr Diverse Total Transfer Labor Diverse Total 
1 845 889 874 2903 2135 2454 2351 
2 1049 998 1006 3995 3151 3054 3212 
3 1156 1162 1161 4674 3790 3703 3827 
4 1303 1301 1301 5273 3987 4250 4216 
5 1433 1432 1432 5595 4513 4452 4608 
6 1755 1551 1568 6280 4763 4528 4769 
7 1675 1679 1678 6594 5237 4884 5155 
8 1822 1811 1812 7794 5692 5370 5588 
9 1947 1944 1944 8643 6096 5786 6045 
10 2099 2095 2096 8142 6694 6334 6564 
11 2240 2252 2251 8220 6866 6482 6718 
12 2415 2411 2411 8946 7420 6901 7192 
13 2602 2595 2595 10807 7686 7532 7671 
14 2835 2818 2819 12973 8432 7974 8303 
15 3031 3069 3066 10601 9120 8526 8799 
16 3344 3353 3352 12925 9709 8727 9130 
17 3708 3717 3717  11152 9659 10240 
18 4306 4258 4261 18821 12749 10985 11796 
19 5171 5162 5163 15190 15134 13403 14125 
20 9712 8345 8485  21997 19659 20522 
Share of 
Population (%) 7.35 62.73 70.08 1.44 12.01 16.47 29.92 
Source: NBS Rural and Urban Household Surveys, 2000. 
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Table 2. Average Educational Attainment, by Location, Stratum and Vingtile 
Vingtile Rural Households Urban Households 
(poorest =1) Agr Diverse Total Transfer Labor Diverse Total 
1 2.17 2.38 2.31 3.50 3.26 3.19 3.24 
2 2.49 2.47 2.48 3.00 3.47 3.44 3.46 
3 2.41 2.44 2.43 5.00 3.87 3.62 3.74 
4 2.62 2.50 2.52  3.54 3.51 3.53 
5 2.55 2.48 2.49 4.00 3.81 3.85 3.83 
6 2.50 2.54 2.54 3.00 3.96 3.58 3.77 
7 2.49 2.59 2.59 5.00 3.88 3.83 3.86 
8 2.59 2.64 2.64  3.83 3.94 3.89 
9 2.55 2.61 2.60  4.13 3.92 4.01 
10 2.60 2.68 2.67  4.07 4.00 4.03 
11 2.75 2.69 2.69  4.05 4.08 4.06 
12 2.60 2.68 2.67  4.14 3.98 4.06 
13 2.63 2.70 2.69  4.30 4.06 4.17 
14 2.73 2.66 2.66  4.20 4.20 4.20 
15 2.61 2.71 2.70  4.24 4.14 4.18 
16 2.67 2.76 2.76 3.00 4.34 4.14 4.21 
17 2.66 2.78 2.77  4.13 4.34 4.24 
18 2.67 2.79 2.78  4.36 4.35 4.36 
19 2.72 2.83 2.82  4.42 4.31 4.36 
20 2.70 2.88 2.87  4.62 4.28 4.42 
Overall average 2.52 2.65 2.63 3.67 4.05 3.99 4.01 
Source: NBS Rural and Urban Household Surveys, 2000. 
Footnote: We calculated the education attainment by assigning the number 1 to illiterate, or semi-literate, 2 = primary 
school, 3 = middle school, 4 = high school and 5 = higher educational attainment.  
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Table 3. Summary of Baseline Calibration  
 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Exogenous specified variables  
GDP Growth Rate (%)  8.1 7.3 7.6 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 
Life expectancy 70.3 71.8 72.0 72.2 73.2 73.4 73.6 73.8 74.0 
Total fertility Rate          
        Urban 1.40 1.45 1.48 1.5 1.52 1.55 1.57 1.59 1.62 
        Rural 2.01 1.95 1.97 1.99 2.01 2.02 2.04 2.06 2.07 
Calibrated results: 
Macroeconomic trends  
Growth rate ( percent)          
Total absorption  11.02 8.53 8.29 8.45 8.39 8.34 8.29 8.25 
Labor force  1.23 1.21 1.17 1.15 1.17 1.16 1.15 1.15 
Capital stock  10.08 10.51 10.45 10.28 10.18 10.08 9.98 9.88 
TFP  2.87 1.74 2.16 2.43 2.44 2.49 2.53 2.56 
          
Ratio to GDP ( percent)          
Private consumption 44.3 47.0 47.3 47.4 47.4 47.4 47.5 47.6 47.6 
Investment 32.7 34.1 35.2 35.9 36.7 37.4 38.1 38.8 39.4 
Export 21.7 25.5 25.7 25.7 25.7 25.7 25.7 25.6 25.6 
Import 16.3 22.9 23.5 23.7 23.8 24.0 24.1 24.2 24.2 
          
Urban/rural per capital income ratio 3.03 2.77 2.74 2.71 2.68 2.65 2.63 2.60 2.58 
Population and labor force 
         
Population (Million) 1236.3 1269.9 1280.5 1290.8 1301.0 1311.5 1321.9 1332.4 1343.0 
   Urban 369.9 397.5 407.2 416.9 426.6 436.5 446.4 456.4 466.5 
   Rural 866.4 872.4 873.3 873.9 874.3 875.0 875.5 876.0 876.4 
Labor force (Million) 640.7 665.6 673.6 681.5 689.4 697.4 705.5 713.6 721.8 
   Urban 181.1 196.9 202.5 208.2 213.8 219.5 225.3 231.2 237.2 
   Rural 459.6 468.7 471.1 473.4 475.6 477.9 480.2 482.4 484.6 
          
Grain self-sufficiency rate (%) 99.5 98.5 98.4 98.4 98.3 98.2 98.1 98.0 98.0 
Share of rural labor force (%) 71.7 70.4 69.9 69.5 69.0 68.5 68.1 67.6 67.2 
Share of agricultural employment in 
total rural labor force (%) 72.0 71.9 71.6 71.6 71.2 71.0 70.9 70.7 70.7 
Data source: Author’s calculation.
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Table 4. Implications of China's Reforms in 2007 (% change) 
 Incremental Effects 
 Labor Market Reforms WTO reforms 









Macroeconomic Variables        
Welfare(EV) 1.46 0.99 0.73 0.73 0.68 3.22 3.92 
GDP 1.55 1.18 0.97 0.65 0.63 3.74 4.39 
Consumption 1.79 -0.25 -0.23 1.02 1.03 1.30 2.35 
Investment 2.86 2.77 2.20 0.46 0.36 8.04 8.42 
Exports 1.87 1.91 1.90 14.98 15.40 5.79 22.08 
Imports 1.72 1.61 1.57 14.23 14.60 4.98 20.31 
        
Factor Prices        
Returns to agr land -0.66 -6.43 -6.55 -3.54 -6.80 -13.14 -19.05 
Capital returns -0.37 0.00 -0.85 -0.56 -0.37 -1.21 -1.58 
Unskilled wages        
  Urban -9.36 -9.93 -6.37 -0.30 -0.75 -23.56 -24.13 
  Rural non-agri 12.88 -10.59 -6.88 -0.34 -0.75 -6.01 -6.72 
  Agricultural 3.30 -14.06 13.90 -0.76 -1.06 1.11 0.04 
      without land return 4.41 17.44 13.90 0.13 -1.06 39.67 38.19 
Semi-skilled wages        
  Urban -4.77 -3.51 -3.65 0.37 0.15 -11.47 -11.34 
  Rural non-agri 18.10 -4.07 -4.20 0.26 0.14 8.54 8.69 
  Agricultural 7.01 -8.38 18.78 -0.28 -0.28 16.46 16.13 
      without land return 9.21 19.57 18.78 0.66 -0.28 55.10 54.66 
Skilled wages        
  Urban 3.44 1.94 1.71 1.11 1.09 7.24 8.41 
  Rural non-agri 3.44 1.94 1.70 1.11 1.09 7.24 8.41 
  Agricultural 3.61 -0.97 15.90 0.42 0.56 18.92 19.58 
      without land return 4.24 17.56 15.90 1.10 0.56 42.02 42.82 
        
Inequality measurement*        
Urban/rural income ratio -0.1724 -0.1672 -0.1509 0.0107 0.0261 -0.4905 -0.4645 
Gini -0.0142 -0.0120 -0.0113 0.0013 0.0025 -0.0375 -0.0350 
   Urban 0.0055 0.0061 0.0059 0.0004 0.0001 0.0174 0.0176 
   Rural 0.0023 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0027 0.0025 
        
Transactions costs        
   Unskilled -47.05 -8.16 -5.19 -0.15 -0.46 -53.90 -54.11 
   Semi-skill -43.75 -1.97 -2.24 0.63 0.42 -46.09 -45.87 
        
Labor Migration (millions)        
Agr-Nonagr  3.78 13.80 12.43 1.89 2.65 30.01 32.67 
Rural-Urban 27.45 10.95 10.00 1.46 2.32 48.39 50.71 
   Unskilled 9.03 3.45 2.46 0.35 0.62 14.93 15.56 
   Semi-skill 18.44 7.20 7.26 1.03 1.59 32.89 34.48 
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   Skilled  -0.02 0.30 0.28 0.07 0.11 0.56 0.67 
Labor Migration (%)        
Agr-Nonagr  4.84 16.85 12.99 2.42 2.45 38.42 41.82 
Rural-Urban 38.54 11.10 9.12 2.05 1.94 67.96 71.22 
   Unskilled 30.78 8.99 5.88 1.20 1.41 50.92 53.05 
   Semi-skill 51.05 13.19 11.76 2.86 2.30 91.09 95.48 
   Skilled  -0.30 5.22 4.64 1.28 1.75 9.78 11.69 
*Change of original value, not % change. 
Data Source: Simulation results. 
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Table 5. Incremental Household Impacts of Labor Market Reforms in China (EV as % of 
households’ income, 2007)  
Vingtile Urban   Rural  
(poorest =1) Transfer 
specialized 
Labor specialized Diversified Ag-specialized Diversified 
Scenario: TRANS      
1 -0.937 -5.422 -4.775 2.992 5.119 
2 -0.555 -4.650 -4.138 3.391 5.483 
3 -0.546 -3.099 -3.670 3.628 5.597 
4 -0.512 -4.372 -3.928 3.802 5.633 
5 -0.507 -3.562 -3.061 3.791 5.764 
6 -0.394 -2.775 -3.644 3.929 6.039 
7 -0.232 -2.682 -2.871 4.093 5.963 
8 -0.211 -3.064 -2.797 3.893 6.197 
9 -0.387 -2.083 -2.554 3.826 6.276 
10 -0.485 -1.860 -2.170 3.796 6.673 
11 -0.370 -2.057 -2.086 3.840 6.653 
12 -0.182 -1.793 -2.091 4.074 6.658 
13 -0.435 -1.165 -2.042 3.994 6.481 
14 -0.239 -1.830 -1.572 4.327 6.628 
15 -0.433 -1.439 -1.565 3.864 6.863 
16 -0.531 -0.821 -1.895 4.131 6.755 
17   -1.831 -1.197 4.440 7.290 
18 0.116 -0.963 -0.775 4.243 6.977 
19 -0.162 -0.612 -1.282 4.126 6.911 
20 0.000 0.226 -0.702 4.387 6.760 
Scenario: LAND      
1 -2.391 -6.589 -5.957 6.997 2.481 
2 -2.396 -5.636 -5.182 7.906 2.738 
3 -2.224 -4.442 -4.969 8.320 2.971 
4 -2.245 -5.418 -5.084 8.924 2.687 
5 -2.358 -4.709 -4.253 8.728 2.779 
6 -2.072 -4.086 -4.790 8.973 2.329 
7 -1.996 -3.951 -4.160 9.566 2.090 
8 -1.233 -4.156 -3.999 9.167 2.179 
9 -1.836 -3.404 -3.846 8.994 2.126 
10 -2.009 -3.365 -3.479 8.840 1.352 
11 -1.830 -3.363 -3.348 8.994 1.542 
12 -1.418 -3.096 -3.357 9.537 1.192 
13 -1.736 -2.699 -3.182 9.402 1.609 
14 -1.503 -3.045 -2.787 10.275 1.854 
15 -1.545 -2.788 -2.709 8.822 1.104 
16 -1.455 -2.378 -2.795 9.606 1.380 
17   -2.898 -2.278 10.564 1.169 
18 -0.154 -2.099 -1.969 9.840 1.166 
19 -0.883 -1.885 -2.043 9.374 1.793 
20 0.000 -1.083 -0.922 10.376 3.543 
Scenario: MOBIL      
1 -2.681 -6.161 -5.649 6.229 2.134 
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2 -2.908 -5.460 -5.139 6.994 2.392 
3 -2.672 -4.479 -4.816 7.411 2.643 
4 -2.735 -5.261 -5.028 7.989 2.385 
5 -2.911 -4.563 -4.251 7.830 2.487 
6 -2.621 -3.974 -4.671 8.126 2.056 
7 -2.543 -3.857 -4.081 8.658 1.855 
8 -1.605 -4.062 -3.977 8.276 1.906 
9 -2.279 -3.481 -3.850 8.095 1.899 
10 -2.445 -3.309 -3.508 7.961 1.106 
11 -2.281 -3.301 -3.372 8.127 1.293 
12 -1.908 -3.038 -3.334 8.670 0.974 
13 -2.040 -2.672 -3.250 8.532 1.390 
14 -1.961 -3.012 -2.912 9.404 1.613 
15 -1.773 -2.712 -2.808 7.972 0.856 
16 -1.687 -2.377 -2.882 8.765 1.164 
17   -2.793 -2.471 9.714 0.868 
18 -0.442 -2.127 -2.131 9.013 0.945 
19 -1.222 -1.878 -2.218 8.565 1.535 
20 0.000 -1.186 -1.431 9.559 3.072 
Data Source: Simulation results. 
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Table 6. Incremental Household Impacts of WTO Accession in the Absence of and in the 
Presence of Labor Market Reforms in China (EV as % of households’ income, 2007)  
Vingtile Urban   Rural  
(poorest =1) Transfer 
specialized 
Labor specialized Diversified Ag-specialized Diversified 
Scenario: WTO-L      
1 0.121 1.542 1.381 0.151 0.355 
2 0.003 1.691 1.568 0.079 0.359 
3 0.035 1.877 1.614 -0.056 0.377 
4 -0.018 1.791 1.442 -0.143 0.369 
5 -0.006 1.775 1.592 -0.066 0.368 
6 0.046 1.898 1.385 -0.089 0.410 
7 0.126 1.954 1.656 -0.172 0.449 
8 0.021 1.915 1.726 0.046 0.406 
9 0.056 2.031 1.637 -0.086 0.376 
10 -0.079 2.166 1.664 -0.022 0.452 
11 -0.011 2.024 1.614 -0.134 0.415 
12 -0.015 2.043 1.610 -0.116 0.435 
13 0.005 2.087 1.604 -0.151 0.400 
14 0.554 2.027 1.564 -0.123 0.433 
15 0.048 2.131 1.660 -0.144 0.456 
16 0.075 2.092 1.517 0.195 0.423 
17   1.917 1.438 0.210 0.506 
18 0.143 1.970 1.568 0.058 0.379 
19 -0.094 2.069 1.314 -0.127 0.342 
20 0.000 2.042 0.798 -0.133 0.304 
Scenario: WTO      
1 -0.274 1.217 1.044 0.446 0.534 
2 -0.548 1.395 1.247 0.426 0.571 
3 -0.450 1.533 1.279 0.343 0.606 
4 -0.534 1.477 1.103 0.295 0.591 
5 -0.584 1.451 1.252 0.366 0.609 
6 -0.464 1.571 1.048 0.355 0.636 
7 -0.397 1.631 1.315 0.320 0.658 
8 -0.287 1.607 1.395 0.522 0.636 
9 -0.381 1.706 1.295 0.370 0.623 
10 -0.550 1.844 1.308 0.409 0.671 
11 -0.457 1.709 1.269 0.316 0.650 
12 -0.397 1.731 1.271 0.367 0.648 
13 -0.356 1.766 1.267 0.345 0.635 
14 0.263 1.719 1.224 0.421 0.683 
15 -0.270 1.826 1.339 0.329 0.678 
16 -0.190 1.768 1.204 0.654 0.664 
17  1.631 1.102 0.782 0.749 
18 0.052 1.682 1.230 0.629 0.642 
19 -0.354 1.774 1.006 0.391 0.618 
20 0.000 1.743 0.506 0.469 0.619 
Data Source: Simulation results. 
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Figure 1. Cumulative Impact of Labor Market Reforms on Urban Households  































Figure 2. Cumulative Impact of Labor Market Reforms on Rurual Households.  
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